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Abstract Most theoretical models predict that institutions allowing for direct legislation
should lead, on average, to policies more closely reflecting the wishes of the voters. While
some agreement exists at the theoretical level about the expected policy consequences of
direct legislation, empirical evidence has been scant so far. In this paper I discuss the reasons
for this scantiness of empirical evidence, namely the intricacies of the adequate empirical
model to test the theoretical proposition, and suggest possible solutions to this problem.
Re-analyzing a dataset with which some authors have found no evidence in support of the
theoretical claim, I show that with a better adapted empirical model we find results in synch
with our theoretical expectations. Thus, policies in states that allow for direct legislation
reflect on average more closely the voters’ wishes. Using Monte-Carlo simulations I also
demonstrate the properties of the proposed estimator and suggest that it could be used in
other contexts, like when assessing the responsiveness of legislators.
Keywords Direct legislation · Referendums · Policy effects · Switching regression ·
US states
1 Introduction
Most research on direct legislation suggests that allowing voters to vote directly on
policies should affect policy outcomes (see Lupia and Matsusaka 2004 for an incisive
review of the literature). Scholars employing game-theoretic models to assess these effects
have mostly found that the policy outcomes should reflect more closely the median voter’s
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preferences.1 Empirical studies have so far, however, had difficulty demonstrating this effect
convincingly. The reason for this is that many empirical studies employ model specifications
which either yield biased estimates of the effect of direct legislation and/or do not allow for
assessing whether the policy is affected in the direction of the median voter’s preferences
(see Matsusaka’s 2001 discussion).
Consequently, I propose in this paper an empirical model, which derives directly from
the theoretically implied predictions on the effect of direct legislation. While the model is
based on a simplifying assumption, its empirical evaluation yields largely results in support
of the theoretical implications on the effect of direct legislation. In Monte Carlo simulations
I also demonstrate that except under very specific conditions, the proposed empirical model
yields improved estimates than a simple OLS regression with a dummy indicator for direct
legislation states.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sect.2, I briefly review the literature on the policy effects
of direct legislation. In Sect. 3, I present first the theoretically implied empirical model, before
discussing specifications that have been employed in the literature. I demonstrate that almost
all of these specifications are based on erroneous assumptions which inevitably result in
biases in the estimated coefficients of relevance. In Sect. 4, I present the results of Monte
Carlo simulations of the proposed empirical model for two setups. These simulations dem-
onstrate that the proposed empirical model provides better estimates and more information
on the effect of direct legislation. In Sect. 5, I employ the proposed empirical model to
assess the effect of direct legislation using a dataset on the US states used by Lascher et al.
(1996). I demonstrate that with a more appropriate empirical model we find, contrary to
these authors, direct legislation effects for several policies, which are in accordance with
predictions from theoretical models. Section 6 summarizes these results and suggests that
the proposed empirical model is also applicable in other research areas, for instance when
studying the responsiveness of legislators in different institutional contexts.
2 The policy effects of direct legislation
There is a large consensus in the literature that institutions for direct legislation affect policy
outcomes.2 Only few authors, like for instance Cronin (1989, p. 232), argue that policies
do not differ between political entities allowing for direct legislation and those that do not.
From the early incisive writings of Key and Crouch (1939), which were largely ignored by
subsequent authors, it also seemed clear that the policy effects of direct legislation may be
of two different sorts. First, the policy effects may be direct, in the sense that policies are
adopted by voters, which would have failed in the normal legislative process. Second, insti-
tutions allowing for direct legislation may have indirect effects when the legislature adopts
policies which it would not have adopted without the presence these institutions. Often such
indirect effects emerge when interested groups threaten legislatures with their own proposals,
which they might try to realize through direct legislation.3
1 Obviously, the notion of median voter only applies in contexts where the policy outcome reflects a one-
dimensional policy space. Tsebelis (2000) and Hug and Tsebelis (2002) propose ways in which the general
theoretical ideas discussed in this paper apply in multidimensional spaces.
2 Gerber and Hug (2001) discuss in much more detail the issues involved in this question.
3 Matsusaka (2000, p. 658) adds a possible signaling effect, namely when “…election returns from initia-
tive contests…convey information to representatives about citizen preferences that they later incorporate into
policy.”
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These two types of effects appear especially clearly in recent theoretical work. Steun-
enberg (1992), Gerber (1996, 1999), Moser (1996), Besley and Coate (2001), Matsusaka
and McCarty (2001), Hug and Tsebelis (2002) and Hug (2004) all show that the overall
consequences of direct legislation comprise both direct and indirect effects.4 From these
theoretical models two other important elements transpire. First, based on their theoretical
implications it appears clearly that sorting out direct from indirect effects empirically is dif-
ficult. This, because these two effects interact and thus form the result of a strategic interplay
among various actors. Second, the theoretical models also demonstrate that the policy effect
of direct legislation, whether direct or indirect, is dependent on at least the preferences of
the legislature and the voters.5 The general thrust of the theoretical results is that under most
conditions, policies adopted under direct legislation will be biased toward the preferences of
the median voter.6 For example, if the legislature would like to spend $1 million on a school
building but the voters prefer spending $2 million, then direct legislation will, on average,
lead to higher expenditures. Conversely, if the same legislature is on a spending spree and
wishes to construct a school-palace for $10 million, direct legislation will lead to policies
closer to the preferred spending level of the frugal voters. Consequently, in one case direct
legislation will lead to higher expenditures, while in the other expenditures will be lower, due
to direct citizen-lawmaking. This shows that the effect of direct legislation is contingent on
the preference configurations of the most important actors, namely voters and the legislature.
In summary, the theoretical literature suggests that institutions for direct legislation have
both direct and indirect effects, but that these two types of effects are difficult to separate
empirically. In addition, the direction of these effects is dependent on the voters’ preferences,
in the sense that policies will reflect more closely these preferences under direct legislation
than in the absence of these institutions.
3 Theory and empirical models
Strictly speaking the theoretical models mentioned above imply an empirical model of the
following type7:
|Yi − Xmi | = f (Xi ) (1)
4 Strictly speaking, the complete information models of Steunenberg (1992) and Gerber (1996, 1999) do not
cover both types of effects. In Steunenberg’s (1992) model initiatives always occur if the status quo is different
from the voters’ preferences, which implies that only direct effects are considered. In Gerber (1996, 1999)
model votes never occur in equilibrium, since the legislature anticipates voter and interest group reactions.
Thus, the predicted policy effects are only of the indirect nature.
5 Most models comprise also an interest group or an opposition, which triggers direct legislation. Given that
various such groups may fulfill this role, their preferences will empirically be of less relevance.
6 It has to be noted that two models find that under very specific conditions, voters may be worse off under
direct legislation. Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) show that if the legislature attempts to be a perfect agent
of the voters, without knowing the latter’s preferences, it may try to preempt ballot measures by adopting
policies, which are detrimental for the voters. This occurs, however, only if the legislature wishes to buy off
an extreme interest group. Similarly, Hug (2004) also finds that if the legislature’s and the voters’ interest are
close, direct legislation may lead to policies less preferred by the voters, because the legislature wishes to avoid
ballot measures. In both models, however, this detrimental effect is dependent on the voters’ preferences. For
instance Proposition 3 in Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) states that policy outcomes may be more extreme
under direct legislation, where “extremeness” is implicitly defined by the distance between the adopted policy
and the expected value of the voters’ preferences. Thus, both positive and negative effects of direct legislation
from the perspective of voters are contingent on the latter’s preferences.
7 Matsusaka (2001) suggests using the square of the differences, which would make deriving an estimator
more complicated. The gist of the argument is, however, the same.
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where Yi is a measure of a particular policy adopted in entity i, Xmi is the median voter’s
preferred policy in this area,8 and Xi contains an indicator variable for the presence of direct
legislation dli and possibly additional control variables. If we had direct measures for both
Y and Xm on the same scale, for instance how much money is being spent for schools and
how much money the median voter wants to spend on schools, we could directly estimate
Eq. 1. With the possible exception of Gerber’s (1996) study on teenage abortions, we almost
never have data on the median voter’s preferences on the same scale as our measure for the
policy outcome.9 To see this problem it is useful to reformulate Eq. 1 in the following way:
if Yi − Xmi > 0, Yi = f (Xi ) + Xmi
if Yi − Xmi ≤ 0, Yi = − f (Xi ) + Xmi
(2)
In this setting it becomes clear that in the absence of a perfect measure of what the median
voter wants (e.g., what amount of money) we cannot estimate Eq. 1 (or the system of Eq. 2
for that matter). Thus, if we have to estimate Xmi with proxies (like the often used conserva-
tive-liberal scale), we cannot derive Eq. 2 directly from Eq. 1. We may presume that Xmi is
related to an array of variables Pi presumably linked to the preferences of the median voter:
Xmi = g(Pi ) (3)
Assuming (falsely) linear relationships for both Eqs. 110 and 3 we get the following system
of equations11:
Xmi = Piβ + i
|Yi − Xmi | = Xiγ + θi (4)
Our theoretical models would lead us to expect a negative value for the component of γ
measuring the effect of direct legislation. Assuming further that i ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) and θi ∼
N (0, σ 2θ )12 we may use Eq. 4 to derive the following two equations:
8 It is interesting to note that exactly the same setup and discussions about the appropriate empirical mod-
els occurred in the literature on the representation and responsiveness of legislators to their constituencies’
preferences (see especially Achen 1977). I will come back to this parallel later in this paper.
9 Again, this point is already made in Achen (1977) incisive critique of the literature on responsiveness.
10 The assumption that Eq. 3 is linear combined with a simplifying distributional assumption (see below)
leads to a switching regression model discussed by Maddala (1983, p. 283, see also Maddala 1986).
11 Hagen et al. (2001), in their response to Matsusaka (2001) critique of their approach suggest a very similar
setup. They ignore, however, that even if the median voter’s preferences could be directly measured, there
would still be measurement error. In the presence of measurement error, as Achen (1977) clearly demonstrates
in the related field of studies on representation and responsiveness, even a simple regression approach is not
feasible in this context. It may help to illustrate this point by the strategy used by some scholars of represen-
tation. If both the voters’ and legislators’ preferences were measured without error (especially the former) we
would expect under the assumption of perfect representation a slope coefficient of 1. Any deviation from this
value of the estimated slope coefficient would suggest less representation. This implies in the context of studies
on the effect of direct legislation, that the estimated coefficient for an interaction effect between the presence
of these institutions and the voters’ preferences may be positive or negative and lead to less representation.
Hence, this slope estimate provides no information on the question whether policy is more responsive in direct
legislation states when used in a linear regression model. The empirical results reported below demonstrate
this point.
12 These assumptions on the marginal distributions of the two error terms make the derived model equivalent
to the switching regression model discussed by Maddala (1983, p. 283). As the results of the Monte-Carlo simu-
lations suggest, both this simplifying assumption concerning the distribution of θi and the linearity assumption
in Eq. 1 do not lead to significant biases in our inferences.
123
Policy consequences 563
if Yi − Xmi > 0, Yi = Piβ + Xiγ + i + θi
if Yi − Xmi ≤ 0, Yi = Piβ − Xiγ + i − θi
(5)
This system of equation can be rewritten in such a way that it becomes a switching regres-
sion model with endogenous switching (Maddala 1983, p. 283), where the superscript for Y
indicates the regime13:
Y 1i = Piβ + Xiγ + i + θi
Y 2i = Piβ − Xiγ + i − θi
Ii = Yi − Piβ − i
Yi = Y 1i if Ii > 0
Yi = Y 2i if Ii ≤ 0
(i + θi , i − θi ,−i ) ∼ N (0, )
(6)
Here it becomes possible to compare the theoretically implied empirical model as speci-
fied by Eq. 6 with other empirical models used in the literature.14 First, one predominantly
used model attempts to assess the effect of direct legislation with a simple dummy indica-
tor in a linear regression model (see for instance Matsusaka 1995, 2000; Matsusaka 2004;
Santoro and McGuire 1997; Kirchgässner et al. 1999; Santoro 1999). This traditionally used
empirical model supposes that the effect of Xi , i.e. the policy bias in non-direct legislation,
is always either positive or negative. If this is not the case, estimating a simple OLS model
with a dichotomous indicator for direct legislation states yields estimates biased toward zero.
Lascher et al. (1996) by adding in addition to the previous model an interaction between
the direct legislation indicator and a preference measure probably attempted to allow for
the conditional effect of preferences as specified in Eq. 6. The system of equation, however,
suggests that the effect of preferences should not vary, but that the effect of the direct leg-
islation dummy is contingent on preferences. Finally, Eq. 6 also shows that Pommerehne
(1978a,b) test based on the error variances between direct and non-direct legislation states
is not accurate, since the variances differ in a more complex way between the two sets of
states, except if we can assume that θ = 0.15
While the system of Eq. 6 provides a close approximation of the theoretical models, a
complication appears, however, in the estimation of the switching regression model since the
switching indicator Ii in Eq. 6 is not observed. More specifically, given that policy outcome
(Y ) and preferences (P) are measured in different scales, we do not observe whether a direct
legislation state is in regime 1 or regime 2 (see Eq. 6). As Lee and Trost (1978) and Maddala
(1983) show, the corresponding log-likelihood function (Eq. 8) is unbounded. In the original
switching regression model with endogenous switching, three distinct error terms appear in
the first three equations of the system of Eq. 6 (Maddala 1983, p. 283). Hence, the variance-
covariance matrix in the original switching regression models contains six different terms. As
Lee and Trost (1978) and Maddala (1983) demonstrate, not all six variance-covariance terms
can be estimated, given that they are not identified. Hence, restrictions have to be imposed.
13 It has to be noted that the two regimes refer to whether in a state with direct legislation voters want more
or less of a specific policy output than the legislator. Hence, implicitly there is a third regime corresponding
to the states without direct legislation. I wish to thank Sven Feldmann for alerting me to this parallel and for
catching a crucial error in a previous version of my argument. In the notation I follow as closely as possible
Maddala (1983, p. 283) in order to make the parallels visible.
14 Bowler and Donovan (2004) also critically discuss some of these models.
15 See Romer and Rosenthal (1979) for a related critique.
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The derivation of the model from theoretical implications proposed here, however, leads only
to two error terms, and thus three distinct terms in the variance-covariance matrix16:
 =
⎡
⎣
σ 2 + σ 2θ + 2σ,θ σ 2 − σ 2θ −σ 2 − σ,θ
σ 2 − σ 2θ σ 2 + σ 2θ − 2σ,θ −σ 2 + σ,θ−σ 2 − σ,θ −σ 2 + σ,θ σ 2
⎤
⎦ (7)
Hence the theoretical model from which the switching regression model here is derived
automatically leads to the restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix necessary to estimate
all the parameters of interest. The likelihood function under the assumption of a normal bivar-
iate distribution of the error terms  and θ with mean 0, variances σ 2 and σ 2θ and covariance
σ,θ (possibly 0) is the following17:
llik = lni [F(Yi − Xmi , σ 2i )
× fN (Y − Piβ − Xiγ, σ 2+θ |Yi − Xmi > i )
+ (1 − F(Yi − Xmi , σ 2i ))
× fN (Y − Piβ + Xiγ, σ 2−θ |Yi − Xmi ≤ i )] (8)
The estimation through maximization of Eq. 8 is simplified by the fact that the vari-
ance-covariance matrix  (Eq. 7) only contains three distinct elements, namely σ 2 , σ 2θ and
σ,θ .
18
4 Monte Carlo simulations
To assess the properties of the proposed switching regression model I carried out a series
of Monte Carlo simulations.19 To generate the datasets I used two setups. The first one was
designed to correspond as closely as possible to the empirical model, while the second one
modeled the effect of direct legislation in a more challenging way. In the first setup the data
were generated in the following way20:
P = 5 + 2 ∗ X1 + 
Y = 2 + 5 ∗ P + θ (9)
16 This variance-covariance matrix follows directly from the error terms appearing in Eq. 6 for Y 1, Y 2 and D.
17 I refrain from deriving in detail this likelihood function since, with the exception of the restrictions on
the variance-covariance matrix it is equivalent to the models presented in Maddala (1983, p. 283) and Wilde
(1998).
18 Wilde (1998) discusses this model in more detail and provides suggestions for the implementation of the
estimation. The estimations carried out for this paper proved rather sensitive to the starting values employed.
I systematically used the OLS-estimates as starting values for the estimation for a restricted version of the
model, namely with the restrictions that σ 2θ = σ,θ = 0. The estimates for this model were then used as
starting values for a model using as only restriction that σ,θ = 0. These estimates were then used as starting
values for the unrestricted model.
19 These simulations have two main objectives. First, given that the proposed empirical model is based on a
simplification, the simulations should show under what conditions this simplification still allows for correctly
estimating the effect of direct legislation. Second, given that most studies assessing the effect of direct leg-
islation rely on a small set of observations, the simulations should assess the small sample properties of the
proposed estimator.
20 Strictly speaking in the second equation the values 2 and 5 could be dropped to correspond perfectly to the
theoretical setup. I maintained these values to allow for additional policy biases.
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The independent variable X1 was generated as a random draw from a uniform distribution
over the unit-interval. To allow for correlation among the error terms  and θ were constructed
in the following way:
 = (1 − j) × α1 + j × α2
θ =
{
α2 + 2 × α3 if dl = 0
α2 + 1 × α3 if dl = 1
(10)
where α1, α2, and α3 are drawn from three independent normal distributions N (0, 1). If
j = 0  and θ are uncorrelated. Letting j vary from 0 to 1, induces increasing correlations
in the error terms. In addition the proportion of states with direct legislation (dl = 1) was
varied from 0, to 0.25 and 0.5.21
This setup obviously quite closely reflects the empirical model proposed. Hence, to carry
out a more challenging test of the empirical model I also performed Monte Carlo simulations
with a second setup. In this latter setup, the following relationships related the exogenous X1
to preferences and policy outcome:
P = 5 + 2 ∗ X1 + 
Y =
⎧⎨
⎩
P + 0 + θ if dl = 1
P + 1 + θ if dl = 0 and α > p
P − 1 + θ if dl = 0 and α ≤ p
(11)
α is drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit-interval and p was varied from 0 to
0.25 and 0.5. In this setup policy deviates by 1 from the preferences of the voters either in
a positive or a negative direction in non direct-legislation states. The value of p determines
the proportion of states for which the effect is in a negative direction. The frequently used
model testing the effect of direct legislation by simply estimating the effect for a dichotomous
indicator implicitly assumes that p = 0 (or p = 1). As p diverges from these extreme values,
the estimates from that traditional empirical model are biased toward zero. The structure of
the error terms was set up in the same way as in the first setup.22
In both setups 1,000 samples for different sizes (i.e., 20, 50, 100, 200,…,1000) were
drawn. As Lee and Trost (1978), Maddala (1983) and Wilde (1998) note, however, the
performance of this estimator is quite sensitive to starting values. In the Monte Carlo simu-
lations this led to failures to reach convergence, especially in runs with small sample sizes.
Consequently for some combinations of sample sizes, parameter values etc., only a small
numbers of runs converged. Instead of playing around with starting values,23 I report the
results for these runs as well, but by highlighting that they are based on smaller number of
replications.
The first results depicted in the eleven panels of Fig. 1 are based on the first setup for
the generation of the data. I report the mean estimate for the direct legislation coefficient
21 The dichotomous dl variable was generated by using a draw from a uniform distribution over the unit
interval. If the value drawn was below 0.5 (resp. 0.25, 0) the value of dl was set to 0, and to 1 else. I varied
this parameter to assess whether the proposed model could also be estimated in a set of observations where
very few units have direct legislation.
22 I compare in the Monte Carlo simulations only the proposed estimator here and the empirical model where
the effect of direct legislation is estimated with a simple dichotomous estimator. The reason for this is that
as I have discussed above, in the approach chosen by Lascher et al. (1996) and Camobreco (1998) there is
no clear expectation what the “correct” estimate for the interaction between voter preferences and the direct
legislation variable should be.
23 In the empirical illustrations provided in this paper it was clearly evident that when trying different starting
values convergence was always obtained.
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Fig. 1 Monte Carlo simulations based on variance specification
obtained from the switching regression (b mle sr) as well as the one obtained from a simple
linear regression (b ols) as a function of the sample size.24 For each mean estimate I also
report confidence intervals based on the distribution of the estimated coefficients. Finally,
each panel corresponds to a different degree of correlation among the errors, going from
values for j from 0 to 1 (see Eq. 10).
The results depicted in Fig. 1 demonstrate essentially two things. First, the OLS esti-
mate is on average zero and thus suggests that direct legislation has no impact on policy,
while the estimate from the switching regression yields a mean estimate very close to the
true value, namely −1. Second, the confidence intervals around these mean estimates shrink
quite quickly from their large values for small sample sizes when moving to larger samples.
Only in the small samples do the confidence intervals around the mean estimate of the switch-
ing regression include the value 0. Both of these results are largely unaffected by increasing
24 In all panels the mean estimated coefficients and confidence intervals are based on 1,000 runs, except for
the smaller sample sizes of 300 or fewer observations. For these runs, on average a few hundred runs are at
the basis of the results. The confidence intervals were approximated in all figures by b ± 2 × sb .
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the correlation between the error terms.25 Consequently, the switching regression estimates
give on average unbiased estimates of the main quantity of interest, namely the coefficient
for the direct legislation dummy. OLS regressions in this particular setup of the Monte Carlo
simulations are unable to detect the effect of direct legislation, since the policy is not biased
in the same direction in all states.
In the second setup, the switching regression model is more thoroughly tested by varying
the degree to which policy is biased in the same direction in non-direct legislation states.
In a first set of Monte Carlo simulations I set the proportion of non-direct legislation states
to 0.5, and in half of them policy is biased in a negative direction, and in half in a positive
one. The size of this effect is equal to 1 again, however, given the way in which the data
is generated, the coefficient from the switching regression depends on the variances of the
other components.
For this reason I depict in Fig. 2 apart the confidence intervals for the OLS and switch-
ing regression result only a line at 0, illustrating whether the estimates on average show a
significant effect for direct legislation.26 As for the previous Monte Carlo simulations, the
mean of the estimated OLS coefficients is approximately 0, independent of the size of the
sample or the correlation in the error terms. In addition, the confidence intervals are again
rather wide, implying that we would systematically reject the hypothesis that direct legis-
lation has an effect on policy. The estimates from the switching regression model, on the
other hand, are systematically negative and for almost all sample sizes the confidence inter-
vals fail to include 0. Only for small sample sizes, i.e. 20, 50, 100 and 200, is this not the
case.27
Again this setup of the Monte Carlo simulations indirectly played in favor of the switch-
ing regression model. Clearly if among the non-direct legislation states the policy bias goes
more frequently in the same direction, the switching regression model will have a harder
time detecting this effect. For this purpose I designed two further Monte Carlo simulations.
In the first a quarter of the non-direct legislation states have a positive policy bias, while in
the second this proportion drops to zero.28
Figure 3 reports the result for the simulations where a quarter of the non-direct leg-
islation states have a positive policy bias.29 For small samples, neither the OLS nor the
switching regression estimates are accurate. The confidence intervals for both estimators
include the value of 0. With sample sizes of 300 or more, largely independent of the corre-
lation between the error terms, both estimators clearly indicate an effect for direct legisla-
tion. Interestingly, the sample sizes starting with which confidence intervals fail to include
the value of 0 are largely the same, though with a small advantage for the OLS estima-
tor. The advantage of the switching regression estimator, however, is that it gives clearly
25 Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient for P in Eq. 9 is affected by increasing correlation between the
two error terms. The bias is, however, largely identical both in the OLS and switching regression estimates.
For this reason I refrain from reporting these results here.
26 Again, problems of convergence with fixed starting values resulted in numbers of runs differing according
to the combinations of parameter values. More specifically, only runs with small correlations between the
error terms (i.e., j ≤ 0.6 in Eq. 10) and sample sizes of at least 200 resulted in approximately 1,000 runs.
27 The wide confidence intervals are closely related to the sensitivity of the estimator to starting values. In
the empirical examples discussed below, even with data with few observations, quite precise estimates could
be obtained, when different starting values were employed.
28 This corresponds to setting p in Eq. 10 to 0.25, respectively 0.
29 Again, the information depicted in the eleven panels is based on 1,000 runs only for small degrees of
correlations in the error terms and sample sizes of at least 200. For all other combinations of parameter values
the results from smaller number of runs are reported.
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Fig. 2 Monte Carlo simulations based on dummy effect with p = 0.5
support to the theoretically derived hypothesis, while the OLS estimator fails to yield this
information.
Finally, when the bias to policy is in the same direction in all non-direct legislation states
the results of the Monte Carlo simulations look as depicted in Fig. 4. Not surprisingly in
this case the tables are turned for the OLS and the switching regression models. Since the
policy bias goes in the same direction in all non-direct legislation states, the OLS model
with a simple dummy variable is able to pick up this effect very well. Hence, the estimated
coefficient is for all sample sizes and correlations of the error terms approximately equal
to 1. The confidence intervals with increasing sample sizes diminish quickly and exclude
0 for most parameter combinations. The switching regression model, however, yields mean
estimates close to zero and also decreasing confidence intervals. The reason for this is obvi-
ously that in the data there is no hint whatsoever that biases may go in opposite directions.
In the absence of such information, the switching regression model is unable to detect this
difference.
The Monte Carlo simulations of the switching regression model compared to the simple
OLS model clearly illustrated the strengths of the former. Provided that the policy biases
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Fig. 3 Monte Carlo simulations based on dummy effect with p = 0.25
in non-direct legislation states are not systematically in the same direction, the switching
regression model gives us accurate estimates of the policy bias that direct legislation allows
to correct for. Only when the policy bias in the non-direct legislation states is always or almost
always in the same direction does the OLS model with a simple dichotomous indicator give us
a better answer. While in such situations the OLS model is preferable, the estimates provided
do not allow us to draw any conclusions on whether the correction of the policy bias due to
direct legislation goes in the direction of the median voter or not. Only information external
to the model, like for instance the information that Matsusaka (2000); Matsusaka (2004) has
collected on contents of direct legislation proposals and other information allow us to gain
some insights in the direction of the policy bias.
5 Policy consequences of direct legislation
While the Monte Carlo simulations already showed that the switching regression model
yields more information on the effect of direct legislation and also provides better estimates
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Fig. 4 Monte Carlo simulations based on dummy effect with p = 0
except under very specific conditions, concrete examples may better illustrate the advantages
of this estimator. To do so I use the data employed by Lascher et al. (1996) (see Table 1
for the policies employed30) to assess the effect of direct legislation in the US states. The
basic specification (see Table 2) uses as independent variables the percentage of high school
graduates, the state per capita income, the percent of urban residents and the ideology scale
proposed by Erikson et al. (1993). Lascher et al. (1996) in addition use a dichotomous indi-
cator for direct legislation and an interaction term between this variable and the ideology
scale. As Matsusaka (2001) demonstrates, these authors erroneously interpret the coefficient
30 I refrained from using the policy of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) for these analyses. The variable
used by Lascher et al. (1996) counts the number of years between the ratification of the ERA amendment
and 1982 but equals 0 for all states not having ratified this amendment. Thus, this variable is censored and is
clearly not appropriate as dependent variable in a linear regression framework. As a consequence I also do not
use Lascher et al.’s (1996) summary index, which corresponds to the sum of the z-values of the eight policy
measures.
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Table 1 Policies and their
measurement
a Source: Erikson et al. (1993,
pp. 75–78) and Lascher et al.
(1996, p. 765)
Variable Policya
AFDC “scope of aid to families with
dependent children”
Consumer policy “enactment of various consumer
protection laws”
Criminal justice policy “use of different approaches
to criminal justice”
Educational expenditures “educational spending per pupil”
Gambling policy “extent to which legalized gambling
is allowed”
Tax policy “tax progressivity”
Medicaid policy “scope of the Medicaid program”
for this interaction term as evidence for the effect of direct legislation and essentially find no
effect.
As in Lascher et al. (1996) these analyses only cover 47 states, since according to Erikson
et al. (1993) the ideology measure for Nevada, Hawaii and Alaska is unreliable, and these
states are thus omitted.31 I report in Table 2 for each of the seven selected policies first
the result of a simple linear regression with a dichotomous indicator for direct legislation
states32 (columns OLS in Table 2).33 The estimates for this variable vary from positive
to negative values and only for the policy of legalizing gambling is the estimated coeffi-
cient statistically significant. Consequently, based on this empirical model we would con-
clude that direct legislation only affects this particular policy in a statistically significant
way.
If we estimate the switching regression model (column MLE in Table 2),34 we find for
four out of the seven policies, namely AFDC, educational expenditures, gambling and Med-
icaid, negative coefficients for the direct legislation variable, as expected by the theoretical
model. Three out of these four negative estimated coefficients are also statistically signif-
icant and thus provide clear support for the hypothesis that direct legislation biases policy
toward the preferences of the voters. The three policies for which we find positive estimated
coefficients are the consumer and the criminal justice policy, as well as tax progressivity.
Among these three estimated coefficients, only the one for criminal justice policy reaches
statistical significance. This result suggests that in direct legislation states policy outcomes
31 Hence, I use exactly the same data as Lascher et al. (1996), including their classification of states as having
or not having direct legislation.
32 In analyses not reported here, I also used as additional independent variable a measure of the difficulty to
qualify a direct legislation measure (i.e., signature requirement as a percentage of the voting population). Also
the results for this additional independent variable yielded support for the empirical model proposed here, but
to simplify the presentation I refrained from reporting these additional results here.
33 I fail to report the results reported in Lascher et al. (1996) since the estimates of their proposed model do not
directly address the relevant theoretical implications. It suffices to say that these authors find for none of their
policies studied the combination of estimated coefficients for the preference measure and the latter’s interaction
with a direct legislation indicator that they would take as evidence for increased policy responsiveness.
34 In the Appendix I also provide predicted probabilities for each state falling into regime 1 in the switching
regression model (see Eq. 6).
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differ more strongly from the voters’ wishes than in non-direct legislation states. Obviously
this contradictory result is counterintuitive. Interestingly enough, however, it is exactly for
this policy and the tax policy where the preference measures are most loosely related to
policy outcomes.35 Hence, the negative results are more likely to be related to the rather poor
proxies for the voters’ preferences than to inherent problems with the proposed empirical
model.
Nevertheless, the results reported in Table 2 demonstrate that the proposed switching
regression model yields improved estimates for the effect of direct legislation. Contrary to
the results presented by Lascher et al. (1996) we find for four of their policies effects for
direct legislation as predicted by the theoretical models. A frequently used model, namely the
one estimating a coefficient for a dichotomous direct legislation indicator, on the other hand,
would suggest policy effects only for one of these policies. Hence, the switching regression
model is a clear improvement over existing models to test for the effect of direct legislation.
As the Monte Carlo simulations suggest, however, it should be used in conjunction with the
traditional models.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In the current discussion of the merits and drawbacks of direct legislation both in the Ameri-
can states and around the world misguided generalizations often lead to erroneous statements
about the effect of direct legislation. Systematic studies of the effect of direct legislation on
policy outcomes (e.g., Matsusaka 1995, 2000; Matsusaka 2004; Gerber 1996, 1999; Gerber
and Hug 1999; Kirchgässner et al. 1999; Besley and Case 2003; Feld and Matsusaka 2003)
come to more nuanced conclusions than journalistic assessments (e.g., Schrag 1998; Broder
2000) or analyses relying on case studies (e.g. Smith 1998).
But even among the more systematic studies it has often proved elusive to find demon-
strable effects of direct legislation on policy outcomes of the type we would expect from
theory. In this paper I argued that the reason for this elusive quest is largely attributable to
questionable empirical models. Based on the basic implication of most theoretical models,
I derived an empirical model which improves on the models currently used by researchers
trying to show that direct legislation has policy consequences. More precisely, this model
directly acknowledges the fact that the effect of direct legislation is contingent on the prefer-
ences of at least the voters. Taking this into consideration in the empirical model I employed
in this paper, I was able to show that results obtained by Lascher et al. (1996) are problematic
and do not allow for the rejection of the theoretically derived hypothesis. More precisely,
using their dataset and using both a simple empirical model testing for systematic policy
biases in non-direct legislation states and the one proposed here, I demonstrated that the
improved empirical model yields results largely in synch with theory and outperforms the
simple model.
This empirical investigation, however, is hardly sufficient to demonstrate the merits of the
empirical model proposed here. In Monte Carlo simulations I also demonstrated that under
most conditions, the proposed switching regression model provides more accurate estimates
than a simple OLS regression. Only under very specific conditions is the latter empirical
model preferable. This suggests that both models should be used simultaneously in order to
35 This can easily be seen when comparing the root-mean squared error of the regressions and the descriptive
statistics of the dependent variables provided in the Appendix.
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assess the effect of direct legislation. If a simple model with only a dummy indicator for the
presence institutions for direct legislation yields a statistically significant coefficient, we can
reject the null-hypothesis that direct legislation fails to affect policy outcomes. The size of
the effect may, however, be biased toward zero and, in the absence of additional information,
we cannot be sure that the bias is toward the median voter’s preferences.36 If the effect of
direct legislation is not significant, this may be due to the bias related to the empirical model
or to a real absence of an effect. In both cases, however, estimating the proposed switching
regression model would yield additional information. In the first case it might yield informa-
tion on whether policy is biased toward the voters’ preferences, while in the second it might
show whether the null-result is due to the misspecified model or the real absence of an effect
of direct legislation.
The use of the proposed empirical model is, however, not limited to assessing the ef-
fect of direct legislation. In very diverse research areas similar questions are raised and
could be assessed with the same empirical model. Two areas may be most prominent for
this. First, and most closely related to the topic of the present paper, the question whether
in majoritarian political systems the preferences of the median voter are more closely re-
flected in government (see for a discussion Powell 2000) should lead to exactly the same
empirical model. Second, the literature on the responsiveness and representativeness of leg-
islators is quite clearly also dealing with the same effects. If we wish to assess the legis-
lators’ responsiveness on particular policies the model proposed here may yield improved
insights.37 Hence, future research first of all on the effects of direct legislation, but also
in other research areas should assess the applicability of the empirical model proposed
here.
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Appendix
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in this paper as well as
their source. Table 4 reports the predicted probabilities for being in regime 1 in the switching
regression models (see Eq. 6).38
36 More specifically, when only estimating a model with a dummy indicator for direct legislation, extraneous
information like in Matsusaka’s (2000, 2004) study comparing the fiscal effects of direct legislation in two
time periods has to be relied on to make arguments for the direction of these effects with regard to citizen
preferences.
37 See Achen (1977) for a discussion of problems in this literature related to the issues discussed here. Bartels
(1991) proposes a parallel way to address the problem discussed in this paper when studying the representa-
tiveness of legislators.
38 I wish to thank Dan Woods for suggesting to report these probabilities.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Source Min. Mean Max. SD N
Direct legislation Dummy (Magleby 1984) 0 0.45 1 0.50 47
Ideology scale State ideology measure −28 −14.60 −0.81 7.30 47
Income Mean income 1980 6.68 9.01 11.54 1.17 47
High school graduates Percent 53 66.40 80 7.32 47
Percent urban Percent of urban population 0 0.53 0.93 0.25 47
AFDC Lascher et al. (1996) 87 241.36 400 83.45 47
Consumer policy Lascher et al. (1996) 4 13.57 21 3.85 47
Criminal justice policy Lascher et al. (1996) −100 153.19 400 131.63 47
Educational expenditures Lascher et al. (1996) 168 237.85 376 47.99 47
Legalized gambling policy Lascher et al. (1996) 0 257.45 600 171.62 47
Tax policy Lascher et al. (1996) −13 −3.45 7 4.67 47
Medicaid policy Lascher et al. (1996) 100 125.94 159 17.70 47
Table 4 Predicted probabilities for regime 1
State Policya
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Alabama 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arizona 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.00 0.00
Arkansas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 1.00
California 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Colorado 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Connecticut 0.91 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Delaware 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Florida 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Georgia 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Idaho 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Illinois 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.00
Indiana 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Iowa 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Kansas 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Kentucky 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Louisiana 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 0.00
Maine 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Maryland 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Massachusetts 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.00 1.00
Michigan 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 1.00 1.00 1.00
Minnesota 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.00 1.00 1.00
Mississippi 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Missouri 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Montana 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
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Table 4 continued
State Policya
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Nebraska 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 1.00
New Hampshire 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
New Jersey 0.00 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
New Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
New York 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
North Carolina 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
North Dakota 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Ohio 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Oklahoma 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.00
Oregon 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Pennsylvania 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Rhode Island 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
South Carolina 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
South Dakota 0.84 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Tennessee 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Texas 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Utah 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Vermont 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00 1.00
Virginia 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Washington 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00
West Virginia 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Wisconsin 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 1.00
Wyoming 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
a1 AFDC, 2 consumer policies, 3 criminal justice, 4 school expenditure per pupil, 5 Gambling, 6 tax policy,
7 Medicaid
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